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Dispositive Pre-Trial Motions in Illinois - Sections
45, 48 and 57 of the Civil Practice Act
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK*
INTRODUCTION
There are two basic types of pre-trial motions which are intended
by the movant to dispose of the case. The first may be called plead-
ing motions; such motions claim that even if all the facts alleged by
the opponent were true, movant would be entitled to judgment. The
second may be called fact motions; they claim that on one or more
dispositive issues, there is no evidence to support the opponent's
position, and that the movant is therefore entitled to judgment.
Litigants tend to confuse the two types; they are especially likely
to make pleading motions when fact motions are appropriate.
In Illinois, the potential for confusion is compounded by the fact
that three different sections of the Civil Practice Act provide for five
different motions to do the work of these two basic types. Those
same sections also provide for other motions that are rarely disposi-
tive. The pleader's problems are further complicated by the fact
that some of the dispositive motions have the same name as some
of the non-dispositive motions. It is little wonder that the reports
are full of cases that were lost or bungled because somebody made
the wrong motion.
Mr. Justice Schaefer gave bench and bar an exasperated lecture
on the subject a few years ago, in a case where defendants success-
fully filed motions "to dismiss and for summary judgment."' Writ-
ing for a unanimous court, he said:
To combine an inquiry into whether a pleading is sufficient to state
a cause of action with an examination which almost necessarily
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assumes that a cause of action has been stated and proceeds to
determine whether there are any material issues of fact to be tried
is likely to confi se both the parties and the court.2
This article seeks to reduce the potential for such confusion. It offers
a detailed review of sections 45,3 481 and 575 of the Civil Practice Act,
2. Id. at 405, 312 N.E.2d at 609.
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 45 (1975). Section 45 provides:
(1) All objections to pleadings shall be raised by motion. The motion shall point
out specifically the defects complained of, and shall ask for appropriate relief, such
as: that a pleading or portion thereof be stricken because substantially insufficient
in law, or that the action be dismissed, or that a pleading be made more definite
and certain in a specified particular, or that designated immaterial matter be
stricken out, or that necessary parties be added, or that designated misjoined par-
ties be dismissed, and so forth.
(2) If a pleading or division thereof is objected to by a motion to dismiss or for
judgment or to strike out the pleading, because it is substantially insufficient in
law, the motion must specify wherein the pleading or division thereof is insufficient.
(3) Upon motions based upon defects in pleadings, substantial defects in prior
pleadings may be considered.
(4) After rulings on motions, the court may enter appropriate orders either to
permit or require pleading over or amending or to terminate the litigation in whole
or in part.
(5) Any party may seasonably move for judgment on the pleadings.
4. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 48 (Smith-Hurd 1978). Section 48 provides:
(1) Defendant may, within the time for pleading, file a motion for dismissal of
the action or for other appropriate relief upon any of the following grounds. If the
grounds do not appear on the face of the pleading attacked the motion shall be
supported by affidavit:
(a) That the court does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action,
provided the defect cannot be removed by a transfer of the case to a court having
jurisdiction.
(b) That the plaintiff does not have legal capacity to sue or that the defendant
does not have legal capacity to be sued.
(c) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same
cause.
(d) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment.
(e) That the action was not commenced within the time limited by law.
(f) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's pleading has been
released, satisfied of record, or discharged in bankruptcy.
(g) That the claim or demand asserted is unenforceable under the provisions of
the Statute of Frauds.
(h) That the claim or demand asserted against defendant is unenforceable be-
cause of his minority or other disability.
(i) That the claim or demand asserted against defendant is barred by other
affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim or demand.
(2) A similar motion may be made by any other party against whom a claim or
demand is asserted.
(3) If, upon the hearing of the motion, the opposite party presents affidavits or
other proof denying the facts alleged or establishing facts obviating the grounds of
defect, the court may hear and determine the same and may grant or deny the
motion. If a material and genuine disputed question of fact is raised the court may
decide the motion upon the affidavits and evidence offered by the parties, or may
deny the motion without prejudice to the right to raise the subject matter of the
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emphasizing the distinctions among the motions and the standards
to be applied to each, together with modest criticisms and sugges-
tions for reform. The limited scope of the suggested reform should
be made clear. The article does not attempt to identify the best
solution to all the questions raised or to set forth a model code of
motion practice. Rather, it suggests only those minimum changes
necessary to eliminate the obvious sources of confusion in existing
law, while retaining as much as possible the terminology and sub-
stance of present Illinois practice.
The phrases used here to categorize motions - "fact motions"
and "pleading motions" - are apparently novel. They refer not to
the questions raised by the motions, which can vary widely, but to
the information on which the motions and their resolutions must be
based. Pleading motions are based solely on the pleadings - mo-
tions to strike or dismiss are typical. Fact motions must be based
on facts, as proven by admissions or by sworn and competent wit-
motion by answer and shall so deny it if the action is one in which a party is entitled
to a trial by jury and a jury demand has been filed by the opposite party in apt
time.
(4) The raising of any of the foregoing matters by motion under this Section
does not preclude the raising of them subsequently by answer unless the court has
disposed of the motion on its merits; and a failure to raise any of them by motion
does not preclude raising them by answer.
(5) Pleading over after denial by the court of a motion under this Section is not
a waiver of any error in the decision denying the motion.
(6) The form and contents of and procedure relating to affidavits under this
Section shall be as provided by rule.
5. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 57 (Smith-Hurd 1978). Section 57 provides:
(1) For plaintiff. Any time after the opposite party has appeared or after the
time within which he is required to appear has expired, a plaintiff may move with
or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment or decree in his favor for
all or any part of the relief sought.
(2) For defendant. A defendant may, at any time, move with or without sup-
porting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part of the
relief sought against him.
(3) Procedure. The opposite party may prior to or at the time of the hearing on
the motion file counteraffidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith
if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although
there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(4) Form of affidavits. The form and contents of and procedure relating to
affidavits under this Section shall be as provided by rule.
(5) Affidavits made in bad faith. If it appears to the satisfaction of the court at
any time that any affidavit presented pursuant to this Section is presented in bad
faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party
employing it to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which
the filing of the affidavit caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees,
and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
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nesses whose testimony has been reduced to writing. The prototypi-
cal fact motion is the motion for summary judgment.
SECTION 45 MOTIONS
The Various Section 45 Motions
1. Motions to Strike
Any party may move to strike all or part of an opponent's plead-
ing. Such a motion may go either to substance or form and it may
or may not be dispositive. Even when the motion goes to substance,
the pleading can often be saved by amendment; thus no one really
expects the motion to dispose of the case.
There are different kinds of motions to strike, serving different
purposes, and litigants are well advised to specify what sort of mo-
tion to strike they are making. The motion to strike the complaint
as substantially insufficient in law raises the question whether the
complaint states a cause of action.' Although the standards are
different, this motion corresponds to the federal motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.7 One may
also move to strike an answer or reply as substantially insufficient
in law." Motions to strike as substantially insufficient in law are the
most important and most common of the motions to strike.
The motion to strike designated matter as immaterial may go to
the merits, as when it tests the relevance of some key fact on which
the pleader relies, but it is often formal. The motion to strike con-
clusions of the pleader is nearly always formal. Other uses of the
motion to strike, for example, to strike a jury demand, appear to be
preserved by the "and so forth" language of section 45(1).
2. Motions to Dismiss
In common usage, lawyers often say "motion to strike" when only
part of a pleading is attacked, and, influenced by the federal rules,
"motion to dismiss" when moving to strike the entire complaint.
However, "motion to dismiss" has a separate meaning in Illinois.
The statutory language contemplates that while pleadings are
"stricken" in whole or in part, only actions are "dismissed".
An order striking the complaint is not a judgment and is not
appealable The remedy from such an order is to amend the com-
6. Janes v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 57 Ill. 2d 398, 406, 312 N.E.2d 605, 609 (1974).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
8. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 45(1) (1975); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
9. Hutter v. Lake View Trust & Say. Bank, 54 11. App. 3d 653, 370 N.E.2d 47, 50 (1st
Dist. 1977); Heiden v. Tambone, 6 Ill. App. 2d 325, 127 N.E.2d 499 (2d Dist. 1955).
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plaint. Under section 46, "amendments may be allowed on just and
reasonable terms,"'" giving plaintiffs further opportunity to state a
cause of action. The "may be allowed" language suggests that plain-
tiffs should seek leave to amend, though no statute or rule explicitly
requires a formal motion. In any event, leave to amend should be
granted unless it is "apparent that even after amendment . . . no
cause of action can be stated."" Sometimes that will be the case,
and more often no amendment will be offered because the litigant
has already alleged as much as he honestly can. But the procedural
rules carefully preserve the right to amend so that it will be avail-
able when needed.
Leave to amend may be sought at any time before final judg-
ment,'" and there is no final judgment after a complaint is stricken
until judgment is explicitly entered dismissing the action. Defen-
dants should move for such an order. Defendants will also find it
expedient to request that a time limit in which to file any amend-
ment be included in the order striking the complaint.' 3
3. Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings
Judgment on the pleadings is not at all like summary judgment,
and there is no such thing as "summary judgment on the plead-
ings," a phrase which has been a recurring source of confusion.,'
Summary judgment is a fact motion, while judgment on the plead-
ings is a pleading motion. Indeed, in its normal application, the
motion for judgment on the pleadings is conceptually indistin-
guishable from the motion to strike a pleading as substantially in-
sufficient in law; there is virtually nothing that can be accomplished
by one that cannot be accomplished by the other.
In the simple case where there is only a complaint, or a complaint
and an answer, and defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings,
the issue raised is whether the complaint states a cause of action.'I
Where the plaintiff moves for judgment on the pleadings, the issue
posed is whether the facts alleged in the answer constitute a legally
10. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 46(1) (1975).
11. Fanning v. Lemay, 78 Ill. App. 2d 166, 172, 222 N.E.2d 815, 818 (5th Dist. 1966), rev'd
on other grounds, 38 Ill. 2d 209, 230 N.E.2d 182 (1967); see Council 19 v. Egan, 52 Ill. App.
3d 1042, 1045, 368 N.E.2d 481, 484 (1st Dist. 1977).
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 46(1) (1975).
13. See Campbell v. Harrison, 16 Ill. App. 3d 570, 306 N.E.2d 643 (1st Dist. 1973); Coatie
v. Kidd, 17 Ill. App. 2d 289, 149 N.E.2d 646 (4th Dist. 1958).
14. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 57 (Smith-Hurd 1978).
15. See Tompkins v. France, 21111. App. 2d 227, 230, 157 N.E.2d 799, 801 (1st Dist. 1959).
16. Pollack v. Marathon Oil Co., 34 111. App. 3d 861, 867, 341 N.E.2d 101,105-06 (5th Dist.
1976); A.A. Erickson Bros. Inc. v. Jenkins, 41 Ill. App. 2d 180, 188, 190 N.E.2d 383, 387 (1st
Dist. 1963).
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sufficient defense. A example of such application by a plaintiff is
Pied Piper Yacht Charter Corp. v. Corbel. ' 7 Plaintiff sued to recover
earnest money deposited under a contract providing for return of the
deposit if the sale was not closed within 30 days. Defendants an-
swered that although the sale had never closed, negotiations had
dragged on for months, the land had been held off the market, and
defendant had suffered losses as a consequence. Plaintiff's motion
for judgment on the pleadings was granted because the facts alleged
in the answer, even if proved, would not constitute a legally suffi-
cient defense under the contract. Although plaintiff was successful
in proceeding as it did, the same result could have been accom-
plished by moving to strike the answer as substantially insufficient
in law under section 45(1).
The final pattern illustrating the similarity between motions for
judgment on the pleadings and motions to strike, is where plaintiff
files a reply alleging matters in avoidance of affirmative defenses
pleaded in the answer. Defendant may test the sufficiency of the
reply by moving for judgment on the pleadings, 18 or by moving to
strike the reply as substantially insufficient in law.
Except as noted, the standards for deciding motions to strike a
pleading as substantially insufficient in law, discussed in detail
below, 9 are fully applicable to motions for judgment on the plead-
ings. It is sufficient here to briefly summarize those rules and note
possible distinctions between the two motions.
A motion for judgment on the pleadings requires the court to
determine whether the pleadings present a material issue of fact.2
If the pleadings present a material issue, the motion must be de-
nied. The motion for judgment on the pleadings does not test
whether there is any evidence to support the pleadings; that must
be done by motion for summary judgment or by trial. The motion
for judgment on the pleadings concedes the well-pleaded facts in the
opposing pleading,21 concedes all fair inferences therefrom,2 2 and
concedes that the movant's own allegations are false insofar as they
have been controverted by opposing pleadings.23 Because of these
17. 17 Ill. App. 3d 281, 308 N.E.2d 35 (1st Dist. 1974).
18. Brown v. Gill. 343 Ill. App. 460, 99 N.E.2d 393 (3d Dist. 1951).
19. See text accompanying notes 35-84 infra.
20. Baillon v. S.S. Kresge Co., 4 Ill. App. 3d 82, 84, 277 N.E.2d 719, 720 (4th Dist. 1972).
21. Walker v. State Bd. of Elections, 65 Ill. 2d 543, 553, 359 N.E.2d 113, 117 (1976);
Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hasp., 47111. 2d 443, 448, 266 N.E.2d 897,899-900 (1970);
Keller v. Brunswick Corp., 54 I1. App. 3d 271, 369 N.E.2d 327 (4th Dist. 1977).
22. Rhodes v. Rhodes, 82 Ill. App. 2d 435, 440, 225 N.E.2d 802, 806 (2d Dist. 1967); A.A.
Erickson Bros., Inc. v. Jenkins, 41 111. App. 2d 180, 188, 190 N.E.2d 383, 385 (lst Dist. 1963).
23. A.A. Erickson Bros., Inc. v. Jenkins, 41111. App. 2d 180, 188, 190 N.E.2d 383, 385 (1st
Dist. 1963); Dryz v. Bol, 19 Ill. App. 2d 406, 409, 153 N.E.2d 859, 862 (1st Dist. 1958).
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rules, cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings must be consid-
ered separately, for if any of the allegations in any pleading are
denied, then one set of facts will be taken as true for purposes of
plaintiff's motion and a different set for purposes of defendant's
motion. It follows that one party cannot be granted judgment on the
pleadings on the other party's motion. If the court concludes that
the party opposing the motion is entitled to judgment on the plead-
ings, it should invite a motion to that effect.
There are some very minor distinctions between the motion for
judgment on the pleadings and the motion to strike as substantially
insufficient in law. One relates to the mechanics of granting judg-
ment. As noted, an order striking a pleading does not immediately
result in judgment since the court must grant leave to amend unless
amendment would be futile."4 Although the phrase "judgment on
the pleadings" suggests that the grant of the motion results in judg-
ment, a movant cannot deprive his opponent of the right to amend
by changing the name of his motion. Therefore, the opponent of a
motion for judgment on the pleadings, like the opponent of a motion
to strike as substantially insufficient at law, is entitled to amend
unless it would be futile. 25 One appropriate procedure is described
in Milanko v. Jensen, '2 where the trial court "announced its decision
to allow" plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings and con-
tinued the cause.27 When defendants "made no move to amend their
answer," judgment was entered for plaintiffs.28 Other solutions are
to grant judgment on the pleadings with leave to amend, or to
simply enter judgment but grant a motion to vacate if an amend-
ment is offered.
Another difference is that undenied allegations in the movant's
pleading may be considered on a motion for judgment on the plead-
ings, 29 but not on a motion to strike. This might conceivably matter
in two situations, although neither is likely to arise very often. First,
on motion to strike, the pleader "cannot seek to rehabilitate" his
pleading by relying on the movant's pleading." By contrast, a mo-
tion for judgment on the pleadings should be denied if the key
24. See text accompanying notes 9-13 supra.
25. Pollack v. Marathon Oil Co., 34 111. App. 3d 861,867-68, 341 N.E.2d 101, 106 (5th Dist.
1976).
26. 404 Ill. 261, 88 N.E.2d 857 (1949).
27. Id. at 265, 88 N.E.2d at 859.
28. Id.
29. A.A. Erickson Bros., Inc. v. Jenkins, 41111. App. 2d 180, 188, 190 N.E.2d 383, 387 (1st
Dist. 1963).
30. McElyea v. Safeway Ins. Co., 131 Il1. App. 2d 452, 458, 266 N.E.2d 146, 150 (1st Dist.
1970).
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missing allegation is supplied by the movant's pleading. But if the
movant notices the defect, he will likely be smart enough not to
plead the missing fact himself. Further, if anything turns on it, the
party opposing the motion may copy the missing allegation into an
amended pleading of his own.
Second, it is conceivable that although a complaint states a cause
of action, no material issue will be presented when it is read in light
of the answer. In that situation a motion to strike would be denied,
but a motion for judgment on the pleadings could be granted. It is
almost impossible to think of examples in which this situation
would actually arise, except for affirmative defenses. Affirmative
defenses can also be raised under sections 48 and 57.
Finally, there may be minor differences with respect to time lim-
its which distinguish the motion for judgment on the pleadings from
other section 45 motions.3'
4. Other Section 45 Motions
Section 45 provides for several other motions that are rarely dis-
positive. One is the motion to have a pleading "made more definite
and certain in a specific particular." This motion does not appear
very often in the reported cases, probably because the movant may
demand a bill of particulars under section 37 by simple notice with-
out a motion. Section 37 requires the party requesting the bill of
particulars to "specifically point out the defects complained of or
the details desired" and to file a copy of the request. The responding
party may furnish the bill, or move to have the request denied or
modified. If he fails to respond, the requesting party may move to
strike his pleading. Motions relating to bills of particulars are com-
mitted to the discretion of the trial court,3" and motions to make
more definite and certain should be similarly treated.
Motions to add necessary parties or to dismiss improperly joined
parties are also made under section 45. But joinder problems are not
grounds for dismissing the entire action or striking the complaint.
The proper remedy for misjoinder or failure to join a necessary party
is to dismiss as to the improper party or to order the missing party
added.3
The motions expressly listed in section 45(1) are not exhaustive
of the methods by which pleadings can be attacked under that
31. See text accompanying notes 207-10 infra.
32. City of Chicago v. Callender, 396 Il. 371, 374, 71 N.E.2d 643, 645-46 (1947); Goldberg
v. Goldberg, 27 Ill. App. 3d 94, 98, 327 N.E.2d 299, 302 (lst Dist. 1975); cf. FED. R. Civ. P.
12(e).
33. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 26 (1975); see Hitchcock v. Reynolds, 278 Ill. App. 559, 563
(3d Dist. 1935); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7).
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section. Instead, they are only offered as examples of the issues that
can be raised under that section. Since "[a]ll objections to plead-
ings shall be raised by motion,"34 a litigant with an objection not
covered explicitly by any other section should object by motion
under section 45.
Motions to Strike Pleadings as Substantially Insufficient in Law
Motions to strike as substantially insufficient in law are the most
important of the section 45 motions and warrant separate treatment
in this article. While the most common application is in the motion
to strike the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, answers
and replies may also be stricken as legally insufficient. Except as
noted above, the rules discussed here also apply to motions for judg-
ment on the pleadings.
1. What May Be Considered
Only the challenged pleading and the relevant law may be consid-
ered on a motion to strike a pleading as insufficient. However, since
a properly filed bill of particulars is part of the pleading which it
particularizes, and exhibits to a pleading are a part thereof, these
can also be considered on a motion to strike. 5 Indeed, operative
legal documents, such as contracts and deeds, attached as exhibits,
control over inconsistent descriptions of them.3 1
Facts outside the pleadings may not be considered. Accordingly,
"[n]ew matter or facts cannot be pleaded in a motion to strike, ''3
and the movant may not set out new facts in affidavits." The mov-
ant may not rely on discovery materials-not even the opponent's
deposition 31-or on affidavits submitted by the opponent. Simi-
larly, the motion may not be opposed by affidavits, although affida-
vits have been considered to avoid injustice when filed by a confused
litigant.4' But the opponent of the motion may properly raise new
34. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 45(1) (1975).
35. City of Chicago v. Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp., 38 Il. App. 3d 835, 839, 349
N.E.2d 902, 905 (1st Dist. 1976), aff'd, 71 Ill. 2d 333, 375 N.E.2d 1285 (1978).
36. See Fowley v. Braden, 4 111. 2d 355, 359-60, 122 N.E.2d 559, 562 (1954) and cases cited
therein; see also W.P. Iverson & Co. v. Dunham Mfg. Co., 18 Ill. App. 2d 404, 152 N.E.2d
615 (1st Dist. 1958).
37. Elliot v. Illinois Central R.R., 318 Ill. App. 112, 119, 47 N.E.2d 375, 378 (lst Dist.
1943).
38. Mutual Tobacco Co. v. Halpin, 414 Ill. 226, 231, 111 N.E.2d 155, 157 (1953).
39. Louis v. Barenfanger, 81 Ill. App. 2d 104, 109, 226 N.E.2d 85, 88 (5th Dist. 1967), aff'd,
39 Il. 2d 445, 236 N.E.2d 724, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 935 (1968).
40. Arthur Rubloff & Co. v. Leaf, 347 I1. App. 191, 196, 106 N.E.2d 735, 737 (1st Dist.
1952).
41. Danaher v. Knightsbridge Co., 56 Ill. App. 3d 977, 979, 372 N.E.2d 862, 865 (1st Dist.
1978).
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facts by amending the challenged pleading.42 There is authority that
answers to requests for admission may be considered," although no
satisfactory explanation is given. If this decision is good law, it must
rest on the view that requests for admission are primarily used to
determine the opponent's position and almost never to gather infor-
mation, and hence they are really part of the pleadings and not a
discovery device.
Where an amended pleading does not refer to or adopt the original
pleading, it completely supersedes the original pleading. Thus, the
original pleading cannot be relied on by either side on a motion to
strike the amended pleading." There is dictum, however, that bind-
ing admissions from an earlier verified pleading may be considered
on motion to strike the amended pleading," but this is clearly
wrong. There is no good reason to permit consideration of such
admissions while like admissions in the pleader's deposition or affi-
davits are excluded from consideration. The provision in section
45(3) that "substantial defects in prior pleadings may be consid-
ered"46 is not inconsistent with exclusion of superseded pleadings.
"Prior pleadings" does not refer to pleadings superseded by
amended pleadings. The phrase instead refers to pleadings still in
effect which are "prior in the sequence of issue formation." '47 Thus,
the complaint is prior to the answer, and both are prior to the reply.
Accordingly, when defendant moves to strike a reply, he also puts
in issue the sufficiency of his own answer and of the complaint. 8 The
provision codifies and simplifies the common law practice of
"carrying back" demurrers."
Sometimes the material excluded from consideration on motion
to strike indicates that the pleading cannot be supported and that
movant is entitled to judgment. In such a case, the proper motion
is for summary judgment. The reports are full of cases where the
complaint was stricken, the action dismissed, and the judgment
42. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 46 (1975).
43. City of Champaign v. Roseman, 15 Ill. 2d 363, 155 N.E. 2d 34 (1959).
44. Bowman v. County of Lake, 29 Ill. 2d 268, 272, 193 N.E.2d 833, 835 (1963); Henkhaus
v. Barton, 56 Ill. App. 3d 767, 770, 371 N.E.2d 1166, 1169 (5th Dist. 1977); W.P. Iverson &
Co. v. Dunham Mfg. Co., 18 Ill. App. 2d 404, 425-26, 152 N.E.2d 615, 625 (1st Dist. 1958).
45. Burdin v. Jefferson Trust & Say. Bank, 133 Il. App. 2d 703, 269 N.E.2d 340 (3d Dist.
1971).
46. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 45(3) (1975).
47. Decatur Mem. Hosp. v. West Lincoln Township, 38 fI1. App. 3d 356, 358-59, 347
N.E.2d 804, 806 (4th Dist. 1976).
48. See id.; Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Pines, 295 Ill. App. 262, 269, 14 N.E.2d 886,
889 (1st Dist. 1938).
49. See Joint Committee Comments and Jenner & Tone, Historical and Practice Notes,
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 45 (Smith-Hurd 1975).
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reversed because defendant relied on evidentiary matter, even
though it seems certain that on remand that same evidentiary mat-
ter will support a successful motion for summary judgment. 0 The
distinction is not a mere technicality; calling the motion a motion
to strike may induce the opponent to forego the submission of affi-
davits or other materials which he would have submitted if the'
motion were properly labeled. Moreover, mislabeling usually indi-
cates that the movant's attorney has not thought through the case
and does not know what he is attacking. Lawyers and trial judges
should avoid such confusion from the beginning, and when neces-
sary, trial judges should point out which motion is designed for
movant's apparent purpose.
Federal rules 12(b) and 12(c) provide that if on motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim or motion for judgment on the pleadings,
"matters outside the pleadings" are presented and not excluded by
the court, then the motion shall be treated as one for summary
judgment and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present the additional material relevant to that motion.5 Illinois
has no comparable rule, but trial judges surely have power to imple-
ment such a procedure on their own. The procedure is workable and
eliminates much of the potential for injustice and delay caused by
mislabeled motions.
2. Standards to be Applied
A surprising amount of confusion surrounds the standards to be
applied when considering motions to strike as substantially insuffi-
cient in law. The standards to be applied to the motion itself are
set out by the statute. All motions objecting to pleadings "shall
point out specifically the defect complained of,"52 and motions
charging that a pleading is substantially insufficient in law "must
specify wherein the pleading . . . is insufficient." 3 The purpose of
these specificity requirements is to inform the opponent of the mov-
ant's contention, so that he can correct the defect by amendment
or intelligently argue that the alleged defect does not exist. The
specificity requirements should be construed to serve this purpose."
Of greater significance are the standards that will be applied to
50. See, e.g., Cain v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 26 Il1. App. 3d 574, 325 N.E.2d
799 (1st Dist. 1975); W.P. Iverson & Co. v. Dunham Mfg. Co., 18 111. App. 2d 404, 152 N.E.2d
615 (1st Dist. 1958); cf. Danaher v. Knightsbridge Co., 56 Il1. App. 3d 977, 979, 372 N.E.2d
862, 865 (1st Dist. 1978) (plaintiff relied on evidentiary matter).
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b), (c).
52. ILL. Riy. STAT. ch. 110, § 45(1) (1975).
53. Id. § 45(2).
54. See Hitchcock v. Reynolds, 278 Ill. App. 559, 563 (3d Dist. 1935).
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the pleading under attack. The motion to strike concedes that all
well-pleaded facts in the pleading attacked are true.55 Of course, the
concession is only for the purposes of the motion and is no longer
binding if the motion is denied. 6 "Conclusions of law or conclusions
of fact unsupported by allegations of specific facts upon which such
conclusions rest" are not conceded and are not to be considered in
ruling on the motion. 7 This rule makes it necessary for courts and
litigants to distinguish "conclusions" from "facts," and to do so
without requiring the pleader to plead his "evidence." The empha-
sis on not pleading conclusions is unfortunate, for the necessary
distinctions cannot be made. There were contemporaneous sugges-
tions that drafters of the Civil Practice Act deliberately sought to
avoid the distinctions.5 8
The Illinois Supreme Court has recognized the difficulty and set
forth a more workable standard, although it has not abandoned the
labels which have caused so much confusion. The court said:
The same allegation might in one context be deemed to be one of
ultimate fact, while in another, "where from a pragmatic view-
point some of these words do not give sufficient information to an
opponent of the character of evidence to be introduced or of the
issues to be tried, they are held to be legal conclusions. What is
law, what are facts and what is evidence, for pleading purposes,
can be determined only by a careful consideration of the practical
task of administering a particular litigation." 9
The court's emphasis on giving sufficient information to the oppo-
nent is in accord with section 42(2) of the Act, which provides that
pleadings need only "reasonably inform[] the opposite party of the
nature of the claim or defense."0 Moreover, the opponent's need for
information must be considered in light of the right to a bill of
particulars and, more importantly, to discovery. The pleadings
55. O'Fallon Dev. Co. v. Ring, 37 Ill. 2d 84, 88, 224 N.E.2d 782, 784 (1967); McCabe v.
Burgess, 57 Ill. App. 3d 450, 452, 373 N.E.2d 327, 328 (4th Dist. 1978).
56. O'Fallon Dev. Co. v. Ring, 37 Ill. 2d 84, 88, 224 N.E.2d 782, 784 (1967); Rosenberg v.
Packerland Packing Co., 55 Ill. App. 3d 961, 962, 370 N.E.2d 1235, 1238 (1st Dist. 1977).
57. Joslin v. Ashelford, 29 Ill. App. 2d 202, 209, 172 N.E.2d 806, 809 (2d Dist. 1961);
accord, Pierce v. Carpentier, 20 Ill. 2d 526, 531, 169 N.E.2d 747, 750 (1960); Stenwall v.
Bergstrom, 398 Ill. 377, 383, 75 N.E.2d 864, 867 (1947); McCabe v. Burgess, 57 Ill. App. 3d
450, 452, 373 N.E.2d 327, 328 (4th Dist. 1978); Henkhaus v. Barton, 56 Ill. App. 3d 767, 770,
371 N.E.2d 1166, 1168 (5th Dist. 1977).
58. Cook, "Facts" and "Statements of Fact", 4 U. CHi. L. REv. 233, 233-34 (1937); see
also Leitch v. Sanitary Dist., 369 Ill. 469, 472, 17 N.E.2d 34, 36 (1938) (no reference to
"conclusions" or "ultimate facts" in Civil Practice Act).
59. Van Dekerkhov v. City of Herrin, 51 Ill. 2d 374, 376, 282 N.E.2d 723, 725 (1972), citing
McCASKILL, ILL. Cxv. PRuc. AcT ANN. 70 (1933).
60. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 42(2) (1975).
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should define the issues with sufficient precision to permit efficient
discovery, for litigants should not have to engage in extensive dis-
covery on non-existent issues. However, if a pleading provides suffi-
cient information to structure discovery, the opponent has no need
for more information at the pleading stage.6'
A pragmatic approach to pleading must also consider the difficul-
ties facing the pleader. Judges should ask themselves what further
detail the pleader could allege, especially without benefit of discov-
ery. For example, it is hard to allege motive except in conclusory
terms. In alleging implied malice, there is little to say after alleging
that there was no justifiable reason for the act. In alleging reliance,
it is hard to allege more than that the pleader would not have spent
his money if he had not believed the misrepresentation. The next
level of detail is the evidentiary facts from which he will ask the jury
to infer malice or reliance at the trial.
The impression is inescapable that the main reason for continued
invocation of the rule against pleading conclusions is fear of unnec-
essary trials. If a plaintiff can state a cause of action by alleging
legal conclusions, he can survive a motion to strike even though no
facts whatsoever support his claim. Judges generally consider that
a bad result. This is understandable, but if the basis of the movant's
claim is that no facts support the pleading, the proper way to dis-
pose of the case is by summary judgment. It is error to strike a
complaint merely because it is unbelievable or because there is no
evidence to support it. Such complaints can be stricken only by first
holding that their key allegations are conclusions and that what is
left after striking the conclusions fails to state a cause of action.
Such reasoning may be harmless when applied to truly frivolous
complaints, but the rule cannot be limited to them. The emphasis
on not pleading conclusions causes unnecessary difficulties for many
plaintiffs with serious but inartfully drawn complaints, with allega-
tions concerning information in defendant's possession, and with
allegations, such as motive, which cannot easily be pleaded in non-
conclusory terms.
In a properly managed litigation, little should turn on character-
izing pleadings as fact or conclusion; the need to make such deter-
minations can usually be avoided. For example, the pleader may
moot the issue by amending, or the trial judge may moot the issue
by asking for new pleadings on his own motion. 2 If the movant
requires more details he may request a bill of particulars or discov-
61. See, e.g., Fanning v. Lemay, 78 Ill. App. 2d 166, 172, 222 N.E.2d 815, 818 (1st Dist.
1966), rev'd on other grounds, 38 Il1. 2d 209, 230 N.E.2d 182 (1972).
62. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 42(1) (1975).
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ery. If no facts support the conclusory pleading, a request for sum-
mary judgment is appropriate.
Unfortunately, the motion to strike pleadings as conclusory is
often used for purely tactical reasons, i.e., as part of the psychologi-
cal battle between attorneys. Judges should not treat such motions
sympathetically. The issue of whether the pleading is conclusory
can also arise in the midst of briefing the motion to strike for sub-
stantial insufficiency in law, as when the movant claims that some
key allegation must not be considered. Inertia may then cause both
sides to fight it out on that line without exploring other solutions.
If a pleading is stricken as conclusory in such a situation, the
pleader obviously should be granted leave to amend.
In spite of the aforementioned drawbacks, there is at least one
good effect of Illinois' emphasis on not pleading conclusions. The
court must consider all possible conclusions supported by the well-
pleaded facts, whether or not the pleader sets forth the conclusions
and even if he sets forth the wrong conclusions. 3 If the well-pleaded
facts support a legally recognizable cause of action, it is unnecessary
to plead the conclusion. Conversely, if the facts do not support a
cause of action, pleading the conclusion adds nothing. This rule is
in accord with the original understanding of modern pleading rules
- that legal theories need not be pleaded. 4 However, the rule is
being abandoned in federal courts. Despite the more liberal federal
pleading rules, federal courts are increasingly likely to require the
pleader to state his legal theories and treat theories not pleaded as
waived.65
The Illinois rule is preferable if reasonably applied, though attor-
neys should not rely on it. Developing legal theories is an advocate's
task, and busy trial judges are not likely to spend time looking for
theories the advocate missed. Nevertheless, if a judge believes that
a pleading may state a claim or defense on a theory not raised by
the parties, his obligation in Illinois is to say so, and that serves the
Act's policy of determining controversies "according to the substan-
tial rights of the parties."6 Even under the Illinois rule, however,
63. See, e.g., Leitch v. Sanitary Dist., 369 Ill. 469, 472-73, 17 N.E.2d 34, 36 (1938);
Aebischer v. Zobrist, 56 III. App. 3d 151, 154, 371 N.E.2d 1003, 1005-06 (5th Dist. 1977);
Browning v. Heritage Ins. Co., 33 Ill. App. 3d 943, 338 N.E.2d 912 (2d Dist. 1975); Jarvis v.
Herrin City Park Dist., 6 Ill. App. 3d 516, 521, 285 N.E.2d 564, 570 (5th Dist. 1972); Johnson
v. North Am. Life & Cas. Co., 100 Ill. App. 2d 212, 219-20, 241 N.E.2d 332, 336 (5th Dist.
1968).
64. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.12 at 89-90 (2d ed. 1977).
65. E.g., Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1025 n.8 (3d Cir.), cert. filed sub nom. City
of Pittsburg v. Mahone, 46 U.S.L.W. 3374 (1977); but see id. at 1054 (Garth, J., dissenting).
66. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 4 (1975).
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the court should consider the possibility that a legal theory has been
waived if it is first asserted so late in the litigation that substantial
prejudice would result.
Section 33(3) provides that "Pleadings shall be liberally con-
strued with a view to doing substantial justice between the par-
ties," 7 and this rule applies when considering motions to strike."8
The pleader is entitled to the benefit of all well-pleaded facts to-
gether with "all reasonable intendments," and "all reasonable in-
ferences" are to be construed in his favor. 7 A complaint should not
be stricken unless the court concludes that there is no possible set
of facts in support of the allegations that would entitle plaintiff to
relief.7' Moreover, there need be only the "mere possibility of recov-
ery,"7  for the court is not to weigh probabilities at this stage.73
Despite the explicit statutory provision and the many cases fol-
lowing it, there is still confusion over how to construe pleadings.
There are many appellate court cases stating that "pleadings are
construed most strongly against the pleader, '74 or that pleadings are
to be construed "strictly. ' 75 There are even a few early supreme
court decisions expressing such views,76 but they are clearly incon-
sistent with the statute. The first strict construction case after the
Civil Practice Act relied on old common law demurrer cases and did
not refer to section 33(3) .77 The strict construction rules have stayed
alive by bare repetition ever since. Often the strict construction
rules appear in the same opinion with the liberal construction rule,
without any effort to reconcile the two statements.78 Some cases
67. Id. § 33(3).
68. First Nat'l Bank v. City of Aurora, 71 111. 2d 1, 8-9, 373 N.E.2d 1326, 1329 (1978);
Fanning v. Lemay, 38 Ill. 2d 209, 211, 230 N.E.2d 182, 184 (1967); Bureau of Credit Control
v. Scott, 36 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 1007, 345 N.E.2d 37, 39 (4th Dist. 1976); Kita v. YMCA, 47 Ill.
App. 2d 409, 420-27, 198 N.E.2d 174, 182 (1st Dist. 1964).
69. Doner v. Phoenix Mutual Joint Stock Land Bank, 381 Ill. 106, 112, 45 N.E.2d 20, 23
(1942).
70. Debolt v. Mutual of Omaha, 56 111. App. 3d 111, 113, 371 N.E.2d 373, 375 (3d Dist.
1978); Cook v. Askew, 34 Il. App. 3d 1055, 1057, 341 N.E.2d 13, 15 (1st Dist. 1975); Bishop
v. Ellsworth, 91 Ill. App. 2d 386, 391, 234 N.E.2d 49, 52 (3d Dist. 1968).
71. Edgar County Bank & Trust Co. v. Paris Hosp., 57 flI. 2d 298, 305, 312 N.E.2d 259,
262 (1974); Danaher v. Knightsbridge Co., 56 Ill. App. 3d 977, 979, 372 N.E.2d 862, 865 (1st
Dist. 1978); Burden v. Lobdell, 93 Il. App. 2d 476, 235 N.E.2d 660 (2d Dist. 1968).
72. Johnson v. North Am. Life & Cas. Co., 100 Ill. App. 2d 212, 220, 241 N.E.2d 332, 336
(5th Dist. 1968).
73. Neurauter v. Reiner, 117 Ill. App. 2d 141, 146, 254 N.E.2d 66, 69 (1st Dist. 1968).
74. E.g.,. Consolidated Constr. Co. v. Great Lakes Plbg. & Htg. Co., 90 Ill. App. 2d 196,
206, 234 N.E.2d 378, 384 (1st Dist. 1967).
75. Epnett v. Goran, 343 Il. App. 521, 99 N.E.2d 595 (1st Dist. 1951).
76. Carroll v. Caldwell, 12 I1. 2d 487, 493, 147 N.E.2d 69, 72 (1958); Fowley v. Braden, 4
Ill. 2d 355, 360, 122 N.E.2d 559, 562 (1954).
77. Klein v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 295 fIl. App. 208, 14 N.E.2d 852 (lst Dist. 1938).
78. People v. Northbrook Sports Club, 53 Ill. App. 3d 331, 368 N.E.2d 663, 665-66 (lst
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limit the strict construction rules by construing pleadings liberally
with respect to matters of form but not with respect to substance.',
Other courts apply the strict construction rules primarily when re-
solving "ambiguous or inconsistent allegations."80 But this too is
inconsistent with the rule of liberal construction, with the rule that
a pleading is entitled to all its reasonable intendments, with the rule
that a pleading is good if any possible set of facts in support of it
would entitle the pleader to relief, and with the right to plead incon-
sistent alternatives when in doubt as to the true facts.8'
One recent supreme court case applied something less than liberal
construction when the pleader was deliberately evasive.12 The case
arose under the Structural Work Act.83 Plaintiff alleged that he was
employed by the general contractor as a foreman and laborer, and
that the owner was in charge of the work, but refused to allege
further details. The supreme court upheld a dismissal because the
allegations appeared inconsistent, and the plaintiff, although af-
forded an opportunity to remove the ambiguity, refused to do so. 4
This narrow holding does not infringe on the statutory right to plead
inconsistent alternatives, for the factual allegations seemed to ne-
gate the allegations that the owner was in charge of the work with-
out giving rise to any alternative theory of liability. In any event,
the court's rationale was much narrower than any version of the
strict construction rules. Given the clear provisions of the Civil
Practice Act, the decision should not be extended to broader appli-
cations.
SECTION 57 MOTIONS (SUMMARY JUDGMENT)
Nature and Purpose of the Motion
1. Generally
Summary judgment is a fact motion: it pierces the pleadings and
raises the question whether there is any evidence to support them.
If, on one or more dispositive issues, there is no evidence to support
one side's position, summary judgment is appropriate. The purpose
is to avoid unnecessary trials by summarily disposing of cases which
Dist. 1977); Bureau of Credit'Control v. Scott, 36 I1. App. 3d 1006, 1007, 345 N.E.2d 37, 39
(4th Dist. 1976); Consolidated Const. Co. v. Great Lakes Plbg. & Htg. Co., 90 Ill. App. 2d
196, 206, 234 N.E.2d 378, 384 (1st Dist. 1967).
79. Klein v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 295 Ill. App. 208, 14 N.E.2d 852 (1st Dist. 1938).
80. E.g., Church v. Adler, 350 Ill. App. 471, 479, 113 N.E.2d 327, 332-33 (3d Dist. 1953).
81. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 43(2) (Smith-Hurd 1978).
82. Van Dekerkhov v. City of Herrin, 51 Ill. 2d 374, 282 N.E.2d 723 (1972).
83. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 60 et seq. (1975).
84. 51 Ill. 2d at 376, 282 N.E.2d at 725.
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present no genuine issues of material fact. 5 Consequently, consider-
ation of a summary judgment motion becomes a preliminary inquiry
to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact which
must be determined by the fact-finder. It is appropriate even in
causes of action under statutes expressly guaranteeing a jury trial, 6
for it may be granted only where there is no genuine jury issue.
Summary judgment existed in some form in Illinois as early as
1872, but prior to 1955 the statute restricted it to certain classes of
"simple" cases and "conclusive" fact patterns.87 The adoption of the
amended section 57 in 1955 greatly expanded the scope and applica-
bility of summary judgment in Illinois,8" by providing for summary
judgment without regard to the cause of action or the complexity
of the fact pattern. Thus, cases decided under the old section are
no longer good law.88
2. Distinguishing Summary Judgment Motions from the Pleading
Motions
Litigants and courts have confused motions for summary judg-
ment with motions for judgment on the pleadings0 and with other
motions to test the sufficiency of the pleadings.8 As noted, the
supreme court has since sternly cautioned against such improper
use of motions. 2 A summary judgment motion should be enter-
tained only if the movant does not contest the legal sufficiency of
the opponent's pleading, or if the pleading is upheld on motion to
strike.
A pleading motion under section 45 submits to the court that the
pleadings raise no issue of fact to be tried and that the movant is
entitled to judgment under the allegations and admissions made on
the face of the pleadings. Summary judgment, on the other hand,
may be based on affidavits, pleadings, depositions and admissions
on file, 3 which may reveal that there is no genuine issue of fact -
85. Giampa v. Sunbeam Corp., 68 I1. App. 2d 425, 429, 216 N.E.2d 233, 235 (1st Dist.
1966).
86. Bleck v. Cosgrove, 32 Il. App. 2d 267, 273, 177 N.E.2d 647, 649-50 (2d Dist. 1961).
87. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 181 (1953) (repealed).
88. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 57. For text of section 57 see note 5 supra. (Smith-Hurd
1978).
89. Allen v. Meyer, 14 Ill. 2d 284, 152 N.E.2d 576 (1958).
90. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 45 (1975). See, e.g., Coursey v. Greater Niles Township Pub'g
Corp., 82 Ill. App. 2d 76, 227 N.E.2d 164 (1st Dist. 1967), aff'd, 40 Ill. 2d 257, 239 N.E.2d 837
(1968) (summary judgment on pleadings and memoranda of law reversed); Tompkins v.
France, 21 Ill. App. 2d 227, 157 N.E.2d 799 (1st Dist. 1959) ("summary judgment on the
pleadings" criticized but affirmed).
91. See, e.g., Metropolitan San. Dist. v. Pontarelli & Sons, Inc., 7 Ill. App. 3d 829, 838,
288 N.E.2d 905, 911 (1st Dist. 1972).
92. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
93. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 57(3) (Smith-Hurd 1978).
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that one side has no evidence to support its position on an issue
raised by the pleadings. A motion to strike as substantially insuffi-
cient in law tests a litigant's legal theory; a motion for summary
judgment tests his evidence. There are exceptions to the last state-
ment-a motion for summary judgment may test one side's legal
theory as applied to the facts revealed by affidavits and discovery.
Thus, the briefs may focus on whether the opponent has any evi-
dence on an issue, or on whether an issue on which he has evidence
is dispositive, or on both. But summary judgment is never based on
the pleadings alone. To grant summary judgment, the court must
know the dispositive facts and conclude that they are not genuinely
disputed. Summary judgment affidavits are a substitute for testi-
mony taken in open court and can contain as much pertinent infor-
mation as the affiant could competently testify to if he were sworn
as a witness."4
3. Motions for Partial Summary Judgment
Although the 1955 amendments generally follow Federal Rule
56,11 one important difference remains. Section 57, like the federal
rule, authorizes summary judgment upon "all or any part of the
relief sought,"'" or "on the issue of liability alone although there is
a genuine issue as to the amount of damages."' 7 Federal Rule 56(d)
provides further that if the court denies summary judgment, it shall
"if practicable . . . make an order specifying the facts that appear
without substantial controversy. . . . Upon the trial of the action
the facts so specified shall be deemed established."' 8 Section 57 does
not include such a provision. A proposal to do so was eliminated
from the final draft of the 1955 amendment because "a majority of
the Joint Committee felt that it tended to invite encroachment upon
the right to trial by jury or court on evidence adduced in open
court."" Thus, the federal precedents, often helpful on summary
judgment issues, are misleading with respect to partial summary
judgment. Unfortunately, there are few Illinois decisions.
The narrower Illinois rule allows summary judgment upon indi-
94. Fooden v. Board of Governors, 48 Il. 2d 580, 272 N.E.2d 497 (1971), cert. denied, 408
U.S. 943 (1972); James F. Goodwin, Inc. v. George W. Bowers Co., 24 Ill. App. 2d 158, 162
N.E.2d 278 (1st Dist. 1960).
95. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
96. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 57(1) (Smith-Hurd 1978).
97. Id. § 57(3).
98. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(d).
99. Jenner & Tone, Historical and Practice Notes, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 57 (Smith-
Hurd 1978).
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vidual counts of a complaint. 00 In Messenger v. Rutherford,'"' the
first district granted summary judgment on five items of an account
stated, without any indication that the items were pleaded in sepa-
rate counts. This suggests that "all or any part of the relief sought"
includes any separate item of damage, even if other items of damage
are sought, and any injunction, even if additional injunctive relief
is also sought. The inference to be drawn from Messenger is a rea-
sonable statutory interpretation. Similar analysis applies to partial
declaratory judgments, but there it is necessary to avoid slipping
into the rejected federal procedure by simply declaring findings on
certain issues. The declaratory judgment must "terminate the con-
troversy or some part thereof."'0 2 Summary judgment is also avail-
able to or against individual parties in multi-party litigation. Fi-
nally, as noted, there is express authorization of interlocutory sum-
mary judgment on liability, followed by further proceedings as to
damages.101
After granting partial summary judgment, the trial judge has
broad discretion to prevent piecemeal litigation or unfair advan-
tage. Supreme Court Rule 192 authorizes the court to enter judg-
ment immediately after granting the motion or to postpone it, to
permit enforcement immediately after judgment or to postpone it,
or to enter immediate judgment only for the excess of movant's
claim over the amount of any unresolved claim of his opponent.'
With respect to summary judgments, this rule should supersede rule
304's more general requirement that partial judgments are interlo-
cutory unless the court expressly finds that there is no reason to
delay immediate enforcement or appeal." 5 However, no cases have
squarely decided the issue.1°0 Thus, to permit immediate appeal
from a partial summary judgment, a cautious trial judge should
make duplicative certification under rules 192 and 304.
What May Be Considered
1. Pleadings
A party may not rely on his own unverified pleading to support
100. Metropolitan San. Dist. v. Pontarelli & Sons, Inc., 7 111. App. 3d 829, 847, 188 N.E.2d
905, 913 (lst Dist. 1972).
101. 130 111. App. 2d 407, 264 N.E.2d 775 (1st Dist. 1970).
102. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 57.1 (Smith-Hurd 1978).
103. Id. § 57(3).
104. Id. ch. 110A, § 192.
105. Id. § 304.
106. See Blanchette v. Martell, 52 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 368 N.E.2d 458 (1st Dist. 1977);
Winger' v. Richards-Wilcox Mfg. Co., 33 Il. App. 2d 115, 178 N.E.2d 659 (Ist Dist. 1961).
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or oppose a motion for summary judgment. 07 "The fact that the
pleading may be verified will generally not affect this rule since the
pleading will rarely (and should not) match the specificity of the
affidavit."''0 While there is authority indicating in dicta that veri-
fied pleadings may not be considered at all, this view is wrong. The
supreme court has stated that consideration must be limited to
"evidentiary facts through affidavits or such,""' and a verified
pleading meets that criterion if it is detailed and shows personal
knowledge by the verifier."' Of course, each side may rely on any
admissions in the opponent's pleadings.' u
Pleadings may also be considered "for the limited purpose of
discerning what issues are raised by the controversy.""' This is a
very limited purpose indeed. Illinois does not follow the federal rule
that the materials in support of a motion for summary judgment
must negate all issues raised by the opponent's pleading." 3 In
Fooden v. Board of Governors, "' several college professors alleged
that they had been terminated for exercising their right of free
speech."' Defendant Board moved for summary judgment, filing an
affidavit stating that since plaintiffs were untenured, they could be
dismissed at will at the end of their term. The affidavit did not give
the reasons for the dismissal and did not deny the free speech allega-
tions of the complaint."' The professors relied on the undisputed
complaint, filing no counter-affidavits. Summary judgment was
granted for the Board, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The
court said that the unverified complaint, based on information and
107. Carruthers v. B.C. Christopher & Co., 57 Ill. 2d 376, 380, 313 N.E.2d 457, 459 (1974);
Fooden v. Board of Governors, 48 Il. 2d 580, 587, 272 N.E.2d 497, 501 (1971), cert. denied,
408 U.S. 943 (1972).
108. Central Clearing, Inc. v. Omega Industries, Inc., 42 Ill. App. 3d 1025, 1026, 356
N.E.2d 852, 855 (1st Dist. 1976).
109. Carruthers v. B.C. Christopher & Co., 57 Ill. 2d 376, 380, 313 N.E.2d 457, 459 (1974)
(emphasis added).
110. Lesser v. Village of Mundelein, 36 I1. App. 3d 433, 437, 344 N.E.2d 29, 32 (2d Dist.
1975); see also Jenner & Martin, Supplement to Historical and Practice Notes, ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110, § 57 (Smith-Hurd 1978 Supp.).
111. Lesser v. Village of Mundelein, 36 Ill. App. 3d 433, 437, 344 N.E.2d 29, 32 (2d Dist.
1975).
112. Ohio Oil Co. v. Yacktman, 36 I1. App. 3d 255, 261, 343 N.E.2d 544, 549 (1st Dist.
1976).
113. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-61 (1970). For criticism of the Federal
rule, see Currie, Thoughts on Directed Verdicts and Summary Judgments, 45 U. Cm. L. REV.
72, 76-79 (1977).
114. 48 Ill. 2d 580, 272 N.E.2d 497 (1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 943 (1972).
115. Id. at 583, 272 N.E.2d at 498-99.
116. Id. at 584-85, 272 N.E.2d at 499; id. at 590, 272 N.E.2d at 502 (Ward, J., dissenting).
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belief, did not raise a triable issue of fact even though it was undis-
puted."7
Fooden may have been wrongly decided. Section 57(3) requires
that the papers show movant to be entitled to judgment, and that
requirement was arguably not met by affidavits which completely
ignored the first amendment allegations on which the complaint
was based. A rule that undisputed allegations in the pleadings may
be considered in opposition to motions for summary judgment
would add more complexity to the procedural system, but it would
not do any serious damage to the more fundamental rule that sum-
mary judgment pierces the pleadings and forces both sides to show
what they can prove.
However, it is more important that the issue in Fooden be settled
than that it be settled any particular way. The rule in Fooden sim-
ply allocates the burden of filing affidavits. If the professors had
filed affidavits supporting their free speech contentions, they would
have been entitled to summary judgment unless the Board filed
additional affidavits denying the charges. If they had filed affidavits
asserting inability to obtain affidavits from the hostile witnesses
who had actual knowledge of the Board's reasons for terminating
them, the Board's motion for summary judgment would have been
denied."' Essentially, they lost because their undisputed allegations
were not sworn.
2. Affidavits
Affidavits are the most common evidence on motions for sum-
mary judgment. Reasserting conclusory pleadings by affidavit for
the sole purpose of avoiding summary judgment, however, is effec-
tively precluded by Supreme Court Rule 191(a), which states that
affidavits supporting or opposing a motion for summary judgment
shall be made on the personal knowledge of the affiants; shall set
forth with particularity the facts upon which the claim, counter-
claim, or defense is based; shall have attached therein sworn or
certified copies of all papers upon which the affiant relies; shall not
consist of conclusions but of facts admissible in evidence; and shall
affirmatively show that the affiant, if sworn as a witness, can tes-
tify competently thereto."'
Although this rule applies explicitly to affidavits only, comparable
standards of reliability must be applied to other material offered to
117. Id. at 587-88, 272 N.E.2d at 501.
118. Id. at 588, 272 N.E.2d at 501; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. ll0A, § 191(b) (1975).
119. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11OA, § 191(a) (1975).
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support or oppose the motion. This is the reason why verified plead-
ings so rarely measure up.110 The court must limit its consideration
to "well-alleged" facts, 2' i.e., facts alleged in a form which complies
with rule 191(a). Statements made on information and belief are
never enough.'2
The Fooden court indicated that the sufficiency of the affidavit
may be tested by "motion to strike, or otherwise. ",123 It is not essen-
tial to move to strike the affidavit as such; one can move to strike
the motion for summary judgment. 14 It should also be sufficient to
argue in one's brief or memorandum in opposition to the motion
that specified portions of the affidavit are conclusory, fail to show
personal knowledge, or are otherwise insufficient. Little purpose is
served by an infinite regress of motions to strike each newly filed
piece of paper.
However, many judges prefer motions to strike insufficient affida-
vits or parts thereof, because such motions keep the record clear.
They also give the party whose affidavit is stricken a chance to
procure a more satisfactory affidavit. But better ways are available
to serve those purposis. Motions to strike require the parties and the
court to decide sufficiency in the abstract, often before they know
for sure which parts of the affidavits will even matter in light of
briefing on the merits. Unless the affidavits are obviously inade-
quate, there will be much less wasted effort if the sufficiency of
particular statements is argued and decided in connection with ar-
gument and decision of the merits. The record can be kept clear by
describing in the order granting summary judgment any statements
that were not considered due to insufficiency. The opponent can still
cure the insufficiency with a supplemental affidavit on motion to
vacate. 2 15 In cases where it seems likely that the insufficiency can
be cured, the court may issue an order striking the insufficient state-
ment and granting time to file further affidavits before deciding the
merits.
120. See notes 108-10 supra and accompanying text.
121. Fooden v. Board of Governors, 48 Ill. 2d 580, 587, 272 N.E.2d 497, 501 (1971), cert.
denied, 408 U.S. 943 (1972).
122. Id.; Petry v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 51 Il. App. 3d 1053, 367 N.E.2d 385 (2d Dist.
1977).
123. 48 Ill. 2d at 587, 272 N.E.2d at 501 (emphasis added); but see Allen v. Meyer, 14 I1.
2d 284, 292, 152 N.E.2d 576, 580 (1958) (suggesting that filing of counter-affidavits concedes
"sufficiency" of the supporting affidavits); see also text accompanying notes 231-32 infra.
124. Anderson v. Dorick, 28 Ill. App. 3d 225, 228, 327 N.E.2d 541, 543 (3d Dist. 1975).
125. Meudt v. Travelers Ins. Co., 57 Ill. App. 3d 286, 292, 372 N.E.2d 902, 906 (1st Dist.
1978); Des Plaines Motor Sales, Inc. v. Whetzal, 58 Ill. App. 2d 143, 147-48, 206 N.E.2d 806,
810 (1st Dist. 1965).
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3. Depositions
Despite restrictive language in some opinions, depositions may
also be used either to support or oppose motions for summary judg-
ment.' " Despite the directive in section 57 that the depositions be('on file,''Ir at least one court has held that an affidavit could quote
admissions from unfiled depositions provided that affiant quoted
verbatim.'1 He could not, however, submit his conclusions based on
the depositions. Nevertheless, an affidavit "declaratory of things
apparent on the face of depositions in the record" has been allowed
to stand.' The court in that case relied on a supreme court holding
that material summarizing exhibits before the court could be in-
cluded in affidavits.'3 Each of these cases seems correct, but where
the affidavit summarizes or describes, it is simply a guide to the
relevant parts of the deposition or exhibit; the affiant's characteri-
zation of the material adds nothing."'
4. Other Discovery Material
In addition to pleadings, depositions, and affidavits, the statute
explicitly authorizes consideration of admissions. 3 ' This includes
any admission by the opponent of the motion. Admissions may be
made in answers to requests for admission under Supreme Court
Rule 216,'3 in depositions if clear and unequivocal,' 34 in pleadings
or affidavits, 3 1 and in interrogatory answers. 3 Out of court admis-
sions may be brought to the court's attention by the affidavit of any
witness with personal knowledge of the admission.' 37
126. Allen v. Meyer, 14 111. 2d 284, 152 N.E.2d 576 (1958); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 57(3)
(Smith-Hurd 1978); see also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 212(a)(4) (1975).
127. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 57(3) (Smith-Hurd 1978).
128. Winger v. Richards-Wilcox Mfg. Co., 33 I1. App. 2d 115, 121, 178 N.E.2d 659, 662
(1st Dist. 1961).
129. Blonar v. Inland Steel Co., 57 Il. App. 2d 99, 207 N.E.2d 124 (1st Dist. 1965).
130. City of Quincy v. Sturhahn, 18 11. 2d 604, 617, 165 N.E.2d 271, 279 (1960).
131. See Reith v. General Tel. Co., 22 Ill. App. 3d 337, 339, 317 N.E.2d 369, 371 (5th Dist.
1974).
132. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 § 57(3) (Smith-Hurd 1978).
133. ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. l0A, § 216 (1975); Joseph W. O'Brien Co. v. Highland Lake
Constr. Co., 9 Ill. App. 3d 408, 292 N.E.2d 205 (1st Dist. 1972).
134. Reith v. General Tel. Co., 22 Il. App. 3d 337, 339, 317 N.E.2d 369, 371 (5th Dist.
1974).
135. Messenger v. Rutherford, 130 11. App. 2d 407, 414, 264 N.E.2d 775, 779 (1st Dist.
1970).
136. Doherty v. National Casting Div., Midland-Ross Corp., 6 Il. App. 3d 329, 331-32,
285 N.E.2d 537, 540 (1st Dist. 1972).
137. Cf. id. at 332-33, 285 N.E.2d at 540 (depositions from another case); Winger v.
Richards-Wilcox Mfg. Co., 33 Il. App. 2d 115, 121, 178 N.E.2d 659, 662 (1st Dist. 1961)
(unfiled depositions).
19781
Loyola University Law Journal
Documents produced under Supreme Court Rule 214 31 may be
made exhibits to affidavits and thus become relevant to motions for
summary judgment. 139 The statute makes no reference to interroga-
tory answers, but there is no reason to treat them differently from
affidavits if they are based on personal knowledge. Supreme Court
Rule 191(b) explicitly authorizes submission of interrogatory an-
swers and documents where the person answering the interrogato-
ries or producing the documents cannot or will not give his affida-
vit.4
5. Missing or Unavailable Evidence
It often happens that one side moves for summary judgment be-
fore the other side has gathered all its evidence. This is particularly
likely where key evidence is in possession of movant. Supreme Court
Rule 191(b) 4 offers the opponent of the motion a solution. The
opponent should file an affidavit, stating that key facts are known
only to those whose affidavits are unavailable to him, setting forth
the facts to which he believes such persons would testify, and his
reasons for that belief. The court may then "make any order that
may be just,' 4 2 including granting or denying the motion or grant-
ing a continuance. Summary judgment would seem proper only if
the missing facts were immaterial. It is possible to imagine cases
where there was no chance at all that the missing facts would ever
be produced, but it is difficult to justify summary judgment in such
a case without permitting the opponent any discovery.
Where the missing facts are in possession of the movant or persons
friendly to him, courts should not require much detail in the oppo-
nent's affidavit of what he thinks the witness would testify to if
called, especially since defendant may move for summary judgment
before plaintiff may initiate discovery.4 3 Most judges will continue
motions for summary judgment to permit reasonable discovery. But
they are not required to do so unless the rule 191(b) procedure is
properly invoked. It is not enough to complain generally that infor-
mation is unavailable, or that the motion is premature, or to ask the
court to speculate on missing facts. "
The rule applies whatever the reason for the unavailability of
138. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 214 (Smith-Hurd 1978).
139. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 191(a) (1975).
140. Id. § 191(b).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Compare § 57(2) with § 201(d).
144. See Fooden v. Board of Governors, 48 Ill. 2d 580, 588, 272 N.E.2d 497, 501 (1971),
cert. denied, 408 U.S. 943 (1972).
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affidavits. The reference to a "continuance to permit affidavits to
be obtained"'' 5 indicates that simple time pressure may be enough,
assuming there is no lack of diligence sufficient to justify serious
penalty. While the rule applies to either party, the movant should
not have to invoke it, since he can simply delay filing his motion.
Standards To Be Applied
Summary judgment shall be granted if "there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a
judgment or decree as a matter of law."' 46 "Genuine" is construed
to mean that there is evidence to support the position of the mo-
tion's opponent.'47 "Material" issues are those that matter to the
result; immaterial issues of fact do not preclude summary judg-
ment. One dispositive issue may make all others immaterial. For
example, in a Structural Work Act case, once it is clear that defen-
dant was not in charge of the work, all other issues become immater-
ial, and defendant is entitled to summary judgment. "'
The Illinois Supreme Court has summarized the above by saying
that if what is submitted to support and oppose the motion "would
have constituted all of the evidence before the court and upon such
evidence there would be nothing left to go to the jury, and the court
would be required to direct a verdict, then a summary judgment
should be entered."'49 This incorporates the rule in Pedrick v. Peoria
& Eastern Railroad,'10 providing that verdicts should be directed
and judgments notwithstanding the verdict entered when "all of the
evidence, . . . viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opponent,
so overwhelmingly favors movant that no contrary verdict based on
that evidence could ever stand."' 5 ' Many trial judges are opposed
to applying this standard to summary judgments; they believe that
it requires them to weigh evidence, that weighing evidence is impro-
per on motion for summary judgment,'52 and that the supreme court
could not possibly have meant what it said.
The supreme court should say it again. The statutory requirement
145. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, § 191(b) (1975).
146. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 57(3) (Smith-Hurd 1978); Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass'n v.
Hamilton, 64 Ill. 2d 138, 141, 355 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1976); Heller v. Sullivan, 57 Il. App. 3d 190,
194, 372 N.E.2d 1036, 1039 (1st Dist. 1978).
147. Carruthers v. B.C. Christopher & Co., 57 Ill. 2d 376, 380, 313 N.E.2d 457, 459, (1974);
Giampa v. Sunbeam Corp., 68 Ill. App. 2d 425, 430-31, 216 N.E.2d 233, 236 (1st Dist. 1968).
148. Carruthers v. B.C. Christopher & Co., 57 Ill. 2d 376, 313 N.E.2d 457 (1974).
149. Fooden v. Board of Governors, 48 Il. 2d 580, 587, 272 N.E.2d 497, 500 (1971), cert.
denied, 408 U.S. 943 (1972).
150. 37 11. 2d 494, 229 N.E.2d 504 (1967).
151. Id. at 510, 229 N.E.2d at 513-14.
152. Fletcher v. Boxx, 10 Il. App. 3d 928, 295 N.E.2d 248 (5th Dist. 1973).
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that the issue of fact be genuine is sufficient to support application
of the Pedrick rule. A single standard for summary judgment, di-
rected verdict, and judgment notwithstanding the verdict is a desir-
able development. It emphasizes that each of these motions serves
the same purpose - each takes the case away from the jury because
of the losing party's complete failure of proof.,' There is no reason
to believe lawyers and judges can meaningfully apply more than one
standard anyway; fine gradations of certainty are illusory.
Even with a unified standard, however, there will be cases where
summary judgment is denied but a verdict is later directed. A judge
has less information at the summary judgment stage; most notably,
he has not heard the witnesses in person. Live testimony provides
demeanor evidence, cross-examination, and usually, a more de-
tailed development of the facts. Without such information, it is
harder to be sure the Pedrick standard is met.' 4
Several rules of construction have been applied and misapplied
to motions for summary judgment. For instance, the motion con-
cedes that all "well-alleged facts" submitted in opposition are true;
similarly, well-alleged facts submitted in support of the motion are
taken as true unless contradicted by well-alleged facts. 5 However,
affidavits supporting the motion are strictly construed, whereas affi-
davits opposing the motion are liberally construed. 6 An oft-stated
but incorrect assumption is that both sides' affidavits must be con-
strued strictly. In reality, the rules are stacked against the movant,
who must show beyond doubt that he is entitled to judgment.'57
Even if the physical facts are completely undisputed, there may
be a triable dispute over the characterization of those facts, or the
inferences to be drawn therefrom.' Moreover, characterization of
153. See Currie, supra note 113, at 76, 79; cf Pedrick v. Peoria & E. R.R. Co., 37 Ill. 2d
494, 503, 229 N.E.2d 504, 510 (1967) (unifying standard for directed verdicts and for reviewing
verdicts on appeal).
154. Kincl v. Hycel, Inc., 56 Ill. App. 3d 772, 781, 372 N.E.2d 385, 392 (1st Dist. 1977);
see Currie, supra note 113, at 79 n.39.
155. Fooden v. Board of Governors, 48 Il. 2d 580, 587, 272 N.E.2d 497, 500 (1971), cert.
denied, 408 U.S. 943 (1972); see also text accompanying note 121 supra.
156. Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Joanna-Western Mills Co., 53 Ill. App. 3d 542, 368
N.E.2d 629, 633 (1st Dist. 1977); Schultz v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 40 I1. App.
3d 800, 807, 352 N.E.2d 310, 316 (2d Dist. 1976); Anderson v. Dorick, 28 111. App. 3d 225, 227,
327 N.E.2d 541, 542 (3d Dist. 1975); Des Plaines Motor Sales, Inc. v. Whetzal, 58 Ill. App.
2d 143, 149, 206 N E.2d 806, 810 (1st Dist. 1965).
157. Di Battista v. Centennial Ins. Co., 52 Ill. App. 2d 84, 86, 201 N.E.2d 466, 468 (4th
Dist. 1964); Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 Ill. App. 2d 412, 416, 199 N.E.2d 300, 303
(5th Dist. 1964).
158. Torrence v. DeFrates, 56 11. App. 3d 118, 120, 371 N.E.2d 1281, 1283 (4th Dist.
1978); Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Joanna-Western Mills Co., 53 Ill. App. 3d 542, 368 N.E.2d
629 (1st Dist. 1977).
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the facts may depend on nuances and details not easily developed
by affidavit. Thus, it is rarely possible to grant summary judgment
on certain issues, for example, negligence. In Wegener v. Anna, ' " an
automobile-pedestrian collision case, the plaintiff pedestrian ad-
mitted in a discovery deposition that he was looking straight ahead
and did not know what color the light was. The trial court entered
summary judgment in favor of defendant on the basis "that the
plaintiff was not, as a matter of law, in the exercise of ordinary
care."'6 0 The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court
did not have before it sufficient information to determine as a mat-
ter of law that plaintiff's conduct was both negligent and a proxi-
mate cause of his own injuries.'"' Similarly, questions of motive,
intent, or subjective feelings are rarely appropriate for summary
judgment. '62 Finally, if the issue is the construction of an ambiguous
contract, summary judgment must be denied if disputed parole
evidence would be admissible.'63 If the affidavits and other materials
disclose a genuinely disputed material issue, summary judgment
must be denied no matter how likely the court thinks it is that the
movant will win at trial. Summary judgment cannot be used to try
the disputed issue. ' 4
Credibility cannot be assessed without live testimony."' Thus, an
inconsistency found in a witness' statement will not support a mo-
tion for summary judgment. In Doherty v. National Casting Div.,
Midland-Ross Corp., '66 movant sought to have a witness' affidavit
disregarded because it was materially inconsistent with his deposi-
tion in another case in which he was a party. Although the inconsis-
tencies were unexplained, the court held that they were relevant
only to impeachment at trial and denied the motion.'67 However, the
court indicated that the result might have been different if the
affiant had been the opponent of the motion instead of a non-party.
This suggestion arose from the court's attempt to distinguish an
earlier case, Burnley v. Moore,6 a case where the plaintiff was
159. 11 111. App. 3d 316, 296 N.E.2d 589 (5th Dist. 1973).
160. Id. at 318, 296 N.E.2d at 590.
161. Id. at 320, 296 N.E.2d at 591.
162. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Short, 125 Ill. App. 2d 97, 106, 260 N.E.2d 415,
419 (5th Dist. 1970).
163. State Bank of Annawan v. Kewanee Nat'l Bank, 16 Ill. App. 3d 272, 274, 305 N.E.2d
732, 733 (3d Dist. 1973); Des Plaines Motor Sales, Inc. v. Whetzal, 58 11. App. 2d 143, 149-
50, 206 N.E.2d 806, 810 (1st Dist. 1965); cf. Herbert H. Rozoff Assoc., Inc. v. Purity Corp.,
56 Il. App. 3d 1, 371 N.E.2d 976 (1st Dist. 1977) (contract not ambiguous).
164. Ray v. City of Chicago, 19 Ill. 2d 593, 599, 169 N.E.2d 73, 76 (1960).
165. Diversey Liquidating Corp. v. Neunkirchen, 370 Ill. 523, 19 N.E.2d 363 (1939).
166. 6 Il. App. 3d 329, 285 N.E.2d 537 (1st Dist. 1972).
167. Id. at 332-33, 285 N.E.2d at 540.
168. 41 111. App. 2d 156, 190 N.E.2d 141 (1st Dist. 1963).
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stabbed by a customer in a bar and sued the owner under the Dram
Shop Act."9 Plaintiff admitted on deposition and in answers to re-
quest for admissio i that she was the barmaid who sold the customer
his drinks. The owner moved for summary judgment on the ground
that plaintiff contributed to the customer's intoxication. Plaintiff
then filed an affidavit stating, without explanation, that she had
served no liquor to her assailant or anyone with him. The court held
that the affidavit raised no genuine issue and granted summary
judgment. Under the Pedrick rule, 7 ' the implication is that even if
she testified in accordance with her affidavit and a series of juries
had believed her, no verdict based on her testimony could ever
stand. This proposition is flawed. It is difficult to see how, without
hearing her live testimony, a judge can decide he would never let a
jury believe her. Moreover, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that
any assessment of credibility on affidavits is unconstitutional.,7'
Perhaps Burnley is best explained on the theory that her responses
to requests for admissions were incontrovertible.'72 Even more trou-
blesome is Giroux v. Karlock, '" indicating that "inconsistencies
• . throughout" the opponent's discovery deposition could be con-
sidered on motion for summary judgment. Giroux and Burnley seem
wrongly decided, although there may be some room for argument
with respect to Burnley.
While it is appealing to ignore obviously perjured affidavits, such
results are impossible to reconcile with the right to have demeanor
considered in credibility determinations. There are other remedies
for perjury besides denying trial. Under section 57(5),74 movant may
be awarded attorneys' fees and expenses, and both the opponent
and his attorney may be punished for contempt of court. The affiant
and any accomplices, including the attorney, may be prosecuted for
perjury, or for suborning perjury. 1 5 While perjury prosecutions are
unlikely, the section 57 remedies could provide an effective deter-
rent if regularly used. The remedy would be even more attractive if
the opponent's attorney were made liable for fees and expenses
169. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd 1978).
170. See text accompanying notes 150-51 supra.
171. Diversey Liquidating Corp. v. Neunkirchen, 370 I1. 523, 19 N.E.2d 363 (1939).
172. Cf. City of Champaign v. Roseman, 15 11. 2d 363, 365, 155 N.E.2d 34, 36 (1959)
(judgment on the pleadings proper where requests for admissions admitted, despite denial of
same facts in pleading); but compare FED. R. Civ. P. 36(b) ("matter admitted ... is conclu-
sively established unless . . . court . . . permits withdrawal or amendment"), with ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110A, § 216 (1975) (no comparable language).
173. 7 Ill. App. 3d 449, 287 N.E.2d 730 (3d Dist. 1972).
174. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 57(5) (Smith-Hurd 1978).
175. Id., ch. 38, §§ 32-2, 32-3 (1975); see also id. §§ 5-2(c), 8-1(a) and 8-2(a).
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when he is culpable, since his client may be insolvent. The advan-
tage of compensation, contempt, and prosecution as compared to
simply granting summary judgment is that each of these remedies
permit credibility to be determined in light of demeanor and cross-
examination.
A commonly heard statement is that when both sides move for
summary judgment, they agree that only a question of law is in-
volved.'76 This is not always true, e.g., if the motions are unrelated,
as where plaintiff moves for summary judgment on the merits and
defendant moves for summary judgment on the ground that plain-
tiff lacks standing. In any event, the parties' agreement is not bind-
ing on the court; it may deny both motions if it finds a material issue
of fact.'77 The normal standards are to be applied to each motion,
and they should be considered independently.'78 All the affidavits
may be considered on both motions,'79 but those that are strictly
construed with respect to one motion will be liberally construed with
respect to the other, and vice versa.
SECTION 48 MOTIONS
Nature of the Motion
The final motion to be considered is authorized by section 48 of
the Civil Practice Act.' 80 Section 48 provides a separate procedure
for raising eight specific defects or defenses and other affirmative
matter. The Joint Committee nearly eliminated it as duplicative,
for all of the section 48 defenses can be raised either under section
45 or section 57. If a section 48 defense appears on the face of the
complaint, defendant may move to dismiss the action without sup-
porting affidavits. This is a pleading motion. A similar motion could
obviously be made under section 45, and the standards to be applied
are identical. Jenner and Tone suggest that the section 45 motion
is more appropriate.'"' If a section 48 defense does not appear on the
face of the complaint, the motion must be supported with affidavits
alleging the defense. This is a fact motion; as Jenner and Tone point
out, it amounts to a summary judgment procedure.' 82 Supreme
176. Allen v. Meyer, 14 Ill. 2d 284, 292, 152 N.E.2d 576, 580 (1958).
177. Precision Extrusions, Inc. v. Stewart, 36 Ill. App. 2d 30, 52, 183 N.E.2d 547, 557 (1st
Dist. 1962).
178. Id.
179. Allen v. Meyer, 14 Ii. 2d 284, 292, 152 N.E.2d 576, 580 (1958).
180. See note 4 supra.
181. Jenner & Tone, Historical & Practice Notes, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 48 (Smith-
Hurd 1978).
182. See id.
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Court Rule 191(a)'83 governs affidavits under both sections 48 and
57. The standards are identical except as noted below. Although
section 48 authorizes both fact motions and pleading motions, it
does not authorize a hybrid; with one rare exception, each individ-
ual motion must be one kind or the other.
84
Because a section 48 motion is called a motion to dismiss, it has
traditionally been held to concede the truth of the complaint.
8 1
Subject to that exception, the motion has been treated like a sum-
mary judgment motion when supported by affidavits. Ordinarily, it
is of no significance that the complaint is taken as true, since all
issues which can be raised under section 48 are in the nature of
affirmative defenses, avoiding the effect of plaintiffs' allegations. 18
Thus, plaintiff must meet affidavits with counter-affidavits; he can-
not rest on his pleadings.'87
Confusion arises when the complaint anticipates affirmative de-
fenses and alleges facts which would negate them. An example is a
section 48 motion based on a statute of limitations, 8 where the
complaint alleges a date of occurrence within the time limit. If the
complaint is conceded, the motion must fail. Affidavits stating that
the occurrence was earlier than alleged are useless, even if no
counter-affidavits are filed. This is the one situation in which Illi-
nois law authorizes a hybrid motion balancing one side's pleading
against the other side's facts. So long as the rule that the complaint
is conceded is retained insofar as the complaint merely states the
cause of action, it should also be retained when the complaint ne-
gates defenses. Arguments over whether the complaint only states
the cause of action or goes further and negates defenses are difficult
to resolve and a waste of time, since a section 57 motion avoids the
whole problem. Thus the hypothetical motion should fail, and sec-
tion 57 should be used instead.
However, Milisaps v. Bankers Life Co.' 9 appears to require plain-
tiff to file counter-affidavits in such a situation. The narrow holding
183. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 191(a) (1975).
184. See text accompanying notes 185-89 infra.
185. Kirk v. Financial Sec. Life Ins. Co., 54 Ill. App. 3d 192, 197, 369 N.E.2d 340, 341
(4th Dist. 1977); Loughman Cabinet Co. v. C. Iber & Sons, Inc., 46 Ill. App. 3d 873, 361
N.E.2d 379 (3d Dist. 1977); Logan v. Presbyterian-St. Luke's Hosp., 92 Ill. App..2d 68, 74,
235 N.E.2d 851, 854 (1st Dist. 1968).
186. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 48(1) (Smith-Hurd 1978); Cain v. American Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 26 Ill. App. 3d 574, 585, 325 N.E.2d 799, 808 (1st Dist. 1975).
187. Leitch v. Hine,'393 Ill. 211, 218-19, 66 N.E.2d 90, 94 (1946); G. Chicoine Contractors,
Inc. v. John Marshall Bldg. Corp., 77 I1. App. 2d 437, 440-41, 222 N.E.2d 712, 713 (2d Dist.
1966).
188. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 48(1)(e) (Smith-Hurd 1978).
189. 35 Ill. App. 3d 735, 741, 342 N.E.2d 329, 334 (2d Dist. 1976).
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of that case is that allegations in the complaint on information and
belief are inadequate to defeat a section 48 motion; presumably,
they would be adequate if the truth of the complaint was conceded.
But Milisaps should not be taken as authoritatively changing the
rule that section 48 motions concede the truth of the complaint,
since it does not squarely address the question.
There are other differences between section 48 and section 57. The
time limits are different and, unlike denial of a section 57 motion,
denial of a section 48 motion may be raised on appeal. Most impor-
tantly, an evidentiary hearing is available in some circumstances
under section 48, but never under section 57. Within section 48's
scope, movant has a choice of procedures if any of these differences
matter. Several of these distinctions will be discussed in greater
detail below.
Issues Which May Be Raised - "Other Affirmative Matter"
Section 48(1) lists eight defects and defenses which can be raised
by the motion.9 0 Section 48(1)(i) authorizes motions raising "any
other affirmative matter" avoiding or defeating the claim. This was
added in 1955. Older cases limiting the motion to the eight named
defenses are no longer good law.'"' "Affirmative matter" has been
construed more broadly than "affirmative defense." A claim that
Illinois rather than Iowa law governed has been entertained under
section 48,192 as has a claim of privilege in a libel suit.'93 But "where
the affirmative matter, so called, is nothing more than evidence
upon which defendant expects to contest a vital fact stated in the
complaint," section 48 cannot be used.' 4 This is in accord with the
rule that the section 48 motion concedes the well-pleaded allega-
tions of the complaint.
A shadow of doubt is cast on these rules by John v. Tribune Co. ,
In that case the defendant newspaper reported that "Dolores Reis-
ing, 57, alias . . . Eve John"'' 0 had been arrested for prostitution.
The real Eve John, age 27, who lived at the same address, sued for
190. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 48(a)(a)-(h) (1975); see note 4 supra.
191. E.g., Hanson v. Raleigh, 391 Il1. 536, 548-50, 63 N.E.2d 851, 855 (1945).
192. Ingersoll v. Klein, 106 I1. App. 2d 330, 336, 245 N.E.2d 288, 291 (2d Dist. 1969), aff'd,
46 Ill. 2d 42, 44-45, 262 N.E.2d 593, 595 (1970).
193. Millsaps v. Bankers Life Co., 35 Il1. App. 3d 735, 740, 342 N.E.2d 329, 335 (2d Dist.
1976).
194. John v. Tribune Co., 19 Ill. App. 2d 547, 553, 154 N.E.2d 862, 865 (1st Dist. 1958),
rev'd on other grounds, 24 Ill. 2d 437, 181 N.E.2d 105, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 877 (1962);
accord, Dangeles v. Marcus, 57 Il1. App. 3d 662, 668, 373 N.E.2d 645, 649 (1st Dist. 1978);
see also Brewer v. Stovall, 54 I1. App. 3d 261, 369 N.E.2d 365 (4th Dist. 1977).
195. 24 11. 2d 437, 181 N.E.2d 105, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 877 (1962).
196. Id. at 439, 181 N.E.2d at 106.
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libel, alleging that the story referred to her. The trial court granted
defendant's section 48 motion, supported by affidavits, which set
out the facts indi-ating that the story could not be construed as
referring to plaintiff. The appellate court reversed, stating that the
motion merely set forth the evidence which tended to disprove the
complaint's allegation that the story referred to plaintiff.'97 There
was a trial, a verdict for defendant, and another appellate court
reversal, this time based on trial -errors.9 On further appeal, the
suireme court held that the trial errors need not be considered
because the first appellate court decision, reversing the grant of the
section 48 motion, had been in error.'
The opinion has been construed as authorizing section 48 motions
"to traverse the ultimate facts alleged in the complaint,"' and so
construed, its authority has been questioned. 20' But that is not the
holding of the case, nor is there any dictum to that effect. The
opinion is difficult to construe, because when the supreme court
acted, a trial record was available on which to decide the issue
originally presented by the section 48 motion. Thus, the court gave
little attention to the procedural situation presented by the first
appeal. The key to the case is the supreme court's holding that
whether the story referred to plaintiff was a question of law, and not
of fact.2 12 Hence, the allegation that the story referred to plaintiff
was a conclusion of law, not to be considered on motion to dismiss.
, Accordingly, it was not conceded by the motion, and the supporting
affidavits did not contradict any well-pleaded allegation of the com-
plaint. The case is therefore consistent with the general rules stated
above.
If anything, John v. Tribune Co. illustrates the pitfalls of a hybrid
motion. All procedural difficulties would have been avoided if de-
fendant had moved for summary judgment. Under section 57, the
pleading would have been irrelevant, and it would have been unnec-
essary to decide whether the allegation was a conclusion or whether
the motion raised affirmative matter. Thus, unless movant wants
an evidentiary hearing under section 48(3), he is foolish to use sec-
tion 48 instead of section 57; he can only make trouble for himself.
197. 19 Ill. App. 2d at 553, 154 N.E.2d at 865.
198. 28 Il1. App. 2d 300, 171 N.E.2d 432 (1st Dist. 1961).
199. 24 I1. 2d at 445, 181 N.E.2d at 107-08.
200. Brewer v. Stovall, 54 Ill. App. 3d 261, 265, 369 N.E.2d 365, 368 (4th Dist. 1977).
201. Id. at 265, 369 N.E.2d at 369.
202. 24 111. 2d at 440-41, 181 N.E.2d at 107.
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Resolving Issues Of Fact
The most important difference between section 48 motions and
section 57 motions is that the judge may sometimes resolve the
section 48 motion even where there is a disputed issue of fact.20 3 He
is to decide on the "affidavits and evidence;" this, together with the
rule against resolving credibility issues without demeanor evidence,
requires an evidentiary hearing if a genuine factual issue is pre-
sented. 04 The court may refuse to hold such a hearing if he denies
the motion without prejudice, but a separate hearing on the affirma-
tive defense can save an unnecessary trial if the defense is good.
Section 48(3) provides that the court may not hold such a hearing
if the opponent of the motion has demanded a jury trial. This provi-
sion does not create any right to jury trial which would not otherwise
exist. 1 1 Section 48(3) implies that the movant's demand for jury
trial is irrelevant; by making a section 48 motion, he consents to a
non-jury hearing of the defense if that becomes necessary.
There is no comparable provision for holding separate hearings on
potentially dispositive issues raised on motion for summary judg-
ment, though similar advantages could be obtained. It has been
held error to separate issues for trial without explicit authoriza-
tion.206
COMPARISON OF TIME LIMITS
The Civil Practice Act and Supreme Court Rules provide poten-
tially significant variations with respect to the timing of the various
dispositive motions. However, many trial judges apply a uniform
rule of reasonableness to requests for continuances and for leave to
file out of time, so the variations between statutory sections are
much less important than they appear.-
Section 45 contains no time limits, except for section 45(5), which
says that motions for judgment on the pleadings "may" be made
"seasonably."'207 The conventional practice in Illinois is to call a
section 45 motion a motion to strike if it attacks the complaint
203. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 48(3) (Smith-Hurd 1978); see also id. § 43(3) (separate trial
of "defense to jurisdiction of the subject matter or in abatement"); id. § 44(2) (separate trial
of separate claims).
204. Emerson v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 40 Ill. App. 3d 794, 797, 352 N.E.2d 45, 48 (2d Dist.
1976).
205. Berk v. County of Will, 34 Ill. 2d 588, 590-91, 218 N.E.2d 98, 100 (1966).
206. Mason v. Dunn, 6 111. App. 3d 448, 285 N.E.2d 191 (2d Dist. 1972); but see dicta and
other cases cited in Opal v. Material Serv. Corp., 9 Ill. App. 2d 433, 449-50, 133 N.E.2d 733,
738-39 (1st Dist. 1956).
207. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 45(5) (1975); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) (motion for judgment
on the pleadings may be made only after the pleadings are closed).
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before an answer is filed, and to call it a motion for judgment on
the pleadings if it comes after the pleadings are closed or if it attacks
the answer or repl;. Thus, the motion for judgment on the pleadings
is "generally made after issues are settled by pleadings." 0' But
these usages are only customary; they are not required by statute,
rule or decision. A motion for judgment on the pleadings before
answer is unusual but proper, at least when made by defendant. °0
Supreme Court Rule 182(c) provides that "a motion attacking a
pleading other than the complaint" must be made within twenty-
one days after the last day for filing the pleading attacked. 10 This
at least applies to motions to strike answers and replies. However,
given the customary usage, and the permissive language of the stat-
ute, there is doubt whether rule 182(c) is intended to apply to mo-
tions for judgment on the pleadings. Moreover, there may be a
practical reason to distinguish the motions for timing purposes: the
various kinds of motions to strike may raise either substance or
form, but the motion for judgment on the pleadings may raise only
substance. However, the language of the rule clearly applies, since
there is no doubt that the motion for judgment on the pleadings
attacks the other party's pleadings. No cases have decided whether
rule 182(c) applies to motions for judgment on the pleadings. A
holding that it does not would hardly be surprising. But it should,
if the rule is retained at all. Most judges will grant reasonable exten-
sions of time for motions that appear serious, and the right to extra
time should not depend on how the motion is labeled.
The most important part of rule 182(c) is its exception. It does not
apply to motions attacking the complaint, which constitute the vast
majority of section 45 motions. Inferentially therefore, such motions
can be made at any time. The distinction between complaints and
other pleadings makes little sense; rule 182(c) should be repealed.
Under section 57 the plaintiff may move for summary judgment
"at any time" after defendant has appeared or was required to
appear."' Defendant may so move "at any time, 2 1 even before
answer."' Moreover, the pendency of the motion tolls the time in
208. Pollack v. Marathon Oil Co.., 34 Ill. App. 3d 861, 867, 341 N.E.2d 101, 106-07 (5th
Dist. 1976); Oak Park Nat'l Bank v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 46 Ill. App. 2d 385, 393,
197 N.E.2d 73, 77 (1st Dist. 1964).
209. Pollack v. Marathon Oil Co., 34 Ill. App. 3d 861, 867, 341 N.E.2d 101, 106-07 (5th
Dist. 1976); but see Columbus Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Century Title Co., 45 Ill. App. 3d 550,
552-53, 359 N.E.2d 1151, 1153 (2d Dist. 1977) (plaintiff cannot use motion for judgment on
the pleadings as substitute for motion for default judgment).
210. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1l0A, § 182(c) (1975).
211. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 57(1) (Smith-Hurd 1978).
212. Id., § 57(2).
213. Metropolitan San. Dist. v. Pontarelli & Sons, Inc., 7 Il1. App. 3d 829, 838, 288 N.E.2d
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which to answer.214 Trial judges are generally hostile to pre-answer
motions for summary judgment and think they should be discour-
aged, since they are apt to cause confusion.2 ' The court should be
sure that such motions are not mislabeled efforts to challenge the
sufficiency of the complaint. It has been suggested that courts faced
with a pre-answer summary judgment motion presume that the
pleadings would join issue.21 A more practical solution is to treat the
motion and affidavits as a temporary answer; they must be looked
to to see what is denied, and everything else can be treated as
admitted until the pleadings are complete.217
The section 48 motion must be made within the time for plead-
ings." 8 However, unless movant seeks an evidentiary hearing under
section 48(3), he can accomplish all his purposes with a motion to
strike the complaint as substantially insufficient in law or for judg-
ment on the pleadings under section 45, or for summary judgment
under section 57.219 Since none of these alternatives is subject to a
time limit, the time limit under section 48 is illusory. Moreover, the
court may grant leave to make a section 48 motion out of time, 20
and most judges do so freely if the motion appears serious and the
delay has not been prejudicial.
COMPARISON OF RULES RESPECTING WAIVER AND APPEAL
Section 42(3) says that all defects in pleadings must be raised in
the trial court, but an exception has been read into the statute.2,
"The objection that the complaint does not state a cause of action,
or a plea does not state a defense, may be raised at any time, either
before or after judgment. ' 22 However, this exception does not ex-
tend to all objections which may be raised on motion to strike as
substantially insufficient in law. "While defects in a complaint con-
taining an incomplete or otherwise insufficient statement of a good
905, 911 (lst Dist. 1972).
214. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 181(a) (1975).
215. Metropolitan San Dist. v. Pontarelli & Sons, Inc., 7 Ill. App. 3d 829, 838-39, 288
N.E.2d 905 (1st Dist. 1972); Moore v. Pinkert, 28 Ill. App. 2d 320, 171 N.E.2d 73 (1st Dist.
1961).
216. Metropolitan San. Dist. v. Pontarelli & Sons, Inc., 7 Ill. App. 3d 829, 839, 288 N.E.2d
905, 911 (1st Dist. 1972).
217. Cf. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 40(2) (1975) (allegations not responded to are admitted).
218. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 48(1) (Smith-Hurd 1978).
219. See Metropolitan San. Dist. v. Pontarelli & Sons, Inc., 7 Ill. App. 3d 829, 839, 288
N.E.2d 905, 911 (1st Dist. 1972).
220. Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 Ill. 2d 42, 44-45, 262 N.E.2d 593, 594 (1970).
221. Gustafson v. Consumer Sales Agency, Inc., 414 Ill. 235, 242-44, 110 N.E.2d 865, 868
(1953).
222. Krachock v. Department of Revenue, 403 I1. 148, 153, 85 N.E.2d 682, 685, appeal
dismissed, 338 U.S. 804 (1949).
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cause of action may be waived, the question of whether a complaint
absolutely fails to state or indicate any ground of liability which the
law will recognize can be raised at any time. '1 22 Thus, such delayed
objections should raise some ultimate legal issue which will control
the outcome of the case if resolved in favor of movant. All other
objections, including motions under sections 48 and 57, are waived
if not raised in the trial court. Moreover, such motions are undoubt-
edly subject to the trial judge's power to control the conduct of the
litigation if they are first raised after unreasonable and prejudicial
delay.
An order denying a motion to strike is not appealable. 24 However,
the movant may plead and still preserve his claim of error for appeal
after final judgment. 25 Some pleading defects may naturally be lost
to the harmless error rule, but the movant may contest the facts
without losing his right to challenge the pleader's legal theory. Simi-
larly, the trial judge also has discretion to permit more than one
motion to strike as substantially insufficient in law by the same side
in the same case. 221
Conversely, when a pleading is stricken and the pleader pleads
over, he waives any right to challenge the order striking his first
pleading. 27 If he wishes to appeal that order, he must refuse to
amend and suffer judgment. His appeal will then "stand or fall on
[the] contents" of the stricken pleading. 22 However, this imposes
no serious dilemma on the pleader. If the amended pleading relies
on the same legal theory as the first, all the relevant allegations of
the first pleading can be repeated and supplemented as necessary.
If the pleader has two theories and one is stricken, and he wants to
preserve it while trying the other theory, he can do so by putting the
two theories into separate counts or defenses of an amended plead-
ing.
The denial of a motion for summary judgment cannot be ap-
pealed, either immediately or after trial. 2 ' The grant of a motion for
summary judgment, on the other hand, normally results in a final
223. Wagner v. Kepler, 411 Ill. 368, 371, 104 N.E.2d 231, 233 (1952).
224. Coble v. Chicago Health Club, Inc., 53 Ill. App. 3d 1019, 369 N.E.2d 188 (1st Dist.
1977).
225. Wright v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 281 111. App. 495, 504 (4th Dist. 1935).
226. Municipal Employes Ins. Ass'n v. Taylor, 300 Ill. App. 231, 20 N.E.2d 835 (1st Dist.
1939).
227. Henkhaus v. Barton, 56 ll. App. 3d 767, 769, 371 N.E.2d 1166, 1168 (5th Dist. 1977);
Villareal v. Trevino, 30 Ill. App. 2d 77, 81, 173 N.E.2d 582, 584 (1st Dist. 1961).
228. Krachock v. Department of Revenue, 403 Ill. 148, 153, 85 N.E.2d 682, 685, appeal
dismissed, 338 U.S. 804 (1949).
229. Home Indemnity Co. v. Reynolds & Co., 38 Ill. App. 2d 358, 366-67, 187 N.E.2d 274,
278 (1st Dist. 1963).
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judgment which of course is appealable. In addition, the trial court
has discretion to permit the filing of additional affidavits on a mo-
tion to vacate the summary judgment.230
There are cases saying, without explanation, that filing affidavits
in opposition to a motion for summary judgment concedes "the
sufficiency" of the motion and supporting affidavits.2 3' Neither the
reason nor the scope of this proposition has ever been made clear.
If this position has not yet been explicitly overruled, it should at
least be limited to purely formal objections.132
Subsections 48(3)233 and 48(4)234 provide that denial of a section
48 motion is without prejudice to its reassertion in the answer unless
the motion is decided on the merits. Denial on the merits requires
a finding that the facts material to the defense are not genuinely
disputed and that they do not constitute a defense, or an evidentiary
hearing at which movant fails to prove his defense.
Section 48(5)235 provides that erroneous denial of the motion may
be raised on appeal even though movant pleads over. Thus, for this
purpose the motion is treated like a section 45 motion instead of a
section 57 motion. This is the logical rule where the denial was on
the merits. It is illogical, though probably harmless, where the de-
nial was without prejudice. Naturally, grant of a section 48 motion,
which normally results in judgment for defendant, is appealable.
SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
Minor suggestions for reform have already been mentioned during
the course of this article. However, four major suggestions have been
reserved because they are related and should be discussed together.
At least three, and possibly all four, would require legislative action.
The suggestions are to eliminate judgment on the pleadings, reco-
dify the rest of section 45, repeal section 48, and adopt a rule or
statute similar to Federal Rule 42(b), which authorizes separate
trial of individual issues. The intended result is to create (1) one
dispositive pleading motion, codified in a separate subsection from
other pleading motions, (2) one dispositive fact motion, and (3) a
procedure for separate trial of potentially dispositive factual issues
which are relatively simple but genuinely disputed.
230. Des Plaines Motor Sales, Inc. v. Whetzal, 58 111. App. 2d 143, 147-48, 206 N.E.2d 806,
809 (1st Dist. 1965).
231. Allen v. Meyer, 14 Ii1. 2d 284, 292, 152 N.E.2d 576, 580 (1958).
232. See notes 123-25 supra and accompanying text.
233. See note 4 supra.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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The pleading motion would concede the allegations of the plead-
ing attacked, and no other allegations would be considered. Thus,
the one potentially important distinction between the present mo-
tions to strike as substantially insufficient in law and for judgment
on the pleadings would be resolved by adopting the motion to strike
procedure. If the movant wished to introduce new facts, he would
do so by affidavit and make a fact motion. This would serve any
conceivable purpose that is now served by considering all the plead-
ings on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and eliminate the
duplication and confusion caused by that motion.
The fact motion would be the present motion for summary judg-
ment. The affirmative matters which can now be raised under either
section 48 or section 57 would be raised by motion for summary
judgment. Section 48 would be repealed as duplicative. Section
48(3), which authorizes separate trial of disputed affirmative mat-
ters, is not duplicative. It should be preserved and expanded by
adoption of a rule similar to Federal Rule 42(b), which reads as
follows:
The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or
when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy,
may order a separate trial of any . . . issue or . . . issues, always
preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury . . . 3
The federal rule goes well beyond section 44(2) of the Civil Practice
Act,27 because it authorizes separate trial of issues that arise within
the same claim.
A careful exploration of provisions for divided trials is beyond the
scope of an article on pre-trial motions. It is sufficient to suggest
that the utility of the separate trial provision in section 48(3) can
be maximized by removing the two limitations which now encumber
it. The first of these is the restriction to affirmative defenses and
other affirmative matter. These are not the only potentially disposi-
tive separate issues which can be profitably tried in advance of more
complicated issues.231 The federal standard of "convenience . .
expedition and economy" states the underlying considerations di-
rectly and is no more difficult to administer than the affirmative
matter requirement.
236. FED. R. Crv. P. 42(b).
237. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 44(2) (Smith-Hurd 1978).
238. See, e.g., Borskey v. American Pad & Textile Co., 296 F.2d 894, 895 (5th Cir. 1961)
(whether accident occurred within Louisiana); Delgado v. Akins, 236 F. Supp. 202 (D. Ariz.
1964) (whether individual defendant was employee of co-defendant United States); Zeisel &
Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis, 76 HARv. L. REv. 1606 (1963)
(whether defendant is liable).
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The second restriction on section 48(3) is the limitation to bench
trials. The potential savings of time, money, and judicial resources
from avoiding unnecessary trials of issues which turn out to be irrel-
evant is even greater in jury cases. There is no reason to forbid
separate trials in jury cases so long as each issue is tried to a jury,
and the separated issue is "so distinct and separable from the other
that a trial of it alone may be had without injustice.1 3
It remains only to sketch the outline of a recodified section 45.
Section 45(1) would provide for the motion to strike pleadings as
substantially insufficient in law. It should also provide that if mat-
ters outside the pleadings are presented and not excluded by the
court, the motion shall be treated as a motion for summary judg-
ment and all parties be given reasonable opportunity to present all
material pertinent to such a motion. Section 45(2) would provide
that every order granting a motion under section 45(1) should do one
of the following: (1) deny leave to amend and direct entry of judg-
ment; or (2) state that judgment will be entered sua sponte if no
amended pleading is filed within a time limit fixed in the order. As
a safeguard, section 45(2) would also provide for a motion for judg-
ment for failure to plead. This would be a technical motion designed
solely to obtain a final judgment after the opponent's pleading was
stricken, no amendment was filed, and the court failed to enter
judgment sua sponte. It would correspond to the present section 45
motion to dismiss after striking of the complaint or reply, and to the
motion for default judgment after striking of the answer. This sepa-
rate subsection would replace that part of present section 45(4)
which makes explicit that the court can enter orders terminating the
litigation after ruling on a section 45 motion. Additional subsec-
tions, or separate sections, would provide for the section 45 motions
which are generally not intended to be dispositive, such as motions
relating to joinder and motions raising formal defects.
At one level, these are the suggestions of a theorist; they reflect a
tendency to value logical neatness. But they are also the suggestions
of a practitioner and a teacher. The present jumble of dispositive
pre-trial motions in Illinois contributes to confusion, wasted effort,
239. Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Rfg. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 500 (1931); see Arthur Young
& Co. v. United States District Court, 549 F.2d 686, 692-97 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct.
109 (1977); Hosie v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 282 F.2d 639, 642-44 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 815 (1961); Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., 71 F.R.D. 606, 612-15 (M.D. Ala. 1976);
In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 70 F.R.D. 23, 28-29 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed, 528
F.2d 5, 14-15 (2d Cir. 1975); Paul Harris Furn. Co. v. Morse, 10 Ill. 2d 20, 45-47, 139 N.E.2d
275, 286 (1956); Bledsoe v. Amiel, 57 Ill. App. 3d 54, 56, 372 N.E.2d 1033, 1034 (1st Dist.
1978); Opal v. Material Serv. Corp., 9 111. App. 2d 433, 449-50, 133 N.E.2d 733, 741 (1st Dist.
1956).
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and occasional injustice. Students find these rules hard to learn.
Some parts of the jumble are worse than others; the duplication in
section 48 is fairly harmless and would remain so if the other three
suggestions were implemented without repealing it. But section 45
is not harmless. Its confusing nomenclature, its mixture of sub-
stance and form, and its duplicative provisions, create procedural
traps into which careless or inexperienced litigators often fall. The
only obstacle to reform is complacency; most lawyers learn from
experience how motion practice works, and eventually forget that
the statute was more a hindrance than a help. That is hardly a
reason for subjecting new generations of lawyers to the same experi-
ence. The statute can and should be amended.
